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Code obfuscation and Lighty Compressor unpacking

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A few words from the author...

When I first started this article I had no idea what “*Lighty Compressor*” is. After a little research I found out that it's a code compressor mostly used in the malware developing scene, which means it's not freely downloadable.

The text below does not pretend to be professionally written, and I don't pretend to be a reverse engineering expert. However, this is my approach of defeating code obfuscation and Lighty's compression.

The application I unpack in the lines below is an old malware sample, probably from the end of 2008, and it's called “*buritos.exe*”.



So, get yourself a beer and continue reading!

Loaded in *OllyDbg*, the code starts here:

```
00401001 | $ 2BC1 | SUB EAX,ECX
00401003 | . 90   | NOP
00401004 | . 33C0 | XOR EAX,EAX
00401006 | . 90   | NOP
```

The main obfuscation code contains a lot of bulk *NOP* instructions that I removed in some of the images below to save space.

```
00401025 | . 90   | NOP
00401026 | . E8 00000000 | CALL buritos.0040102B
00401028 | $ 90   | NOP
0040102C | . 90   | NOP
0040102D | . 90   | NOP
0040102E | . 5B   | POP EBX
0040102F | . 90   | NOP
00401030 | . 90   | NOP
```

The first *CALL* is a simple implementation of a code taking the *EIP* value. Entering that call will put the return address in the stack:

```
0012FFB3 | 0040102B | RETURN to buritos.<ModuleEntryPoint>+2A from buritos.0040102B
```

Then by calling the next address, the stack will contain the returning address, that is then *POP*-ed to the *EBX* register at address 0040102E.

```
00401034 | . 66:33DB | XOR BX,BX
00401037 | . 90   | NOP
00401038 | . 90   | NOP
00401039 | . 8BC3 | MOV EAX,EBX
```

Since *EBX* holds the current *EIP*, its low word will get *XOR*-ed by *XOR BX,BX* to null it and voilà, *EBX* is pointing to the *ImageBase* address.

```
EAX 00000000
ECX FEBD050F
EDX 3E4875CA
EBX 00400000 buritos.00400000
ESP 0012FFB4
EBP 0012FFF0
ESI FFFFFFFF
EDI 7C910738 ntdll.7C910738
EIP 00401037 buritos.00401037
```

```
00401039 | . 8BC3 | MOV EAX,EBX
0040103B | . 0340 3C | ADD EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+3C]
0040103E | . 90   | NOP
0040103F | . 90   | NOP
00401040 | . 90   | NOP
00401041 | . 0FB750 14 | MOVZX EDX,WORD PTR DS:[EAX+14]
00401045 | . 90   | NOP
00401046 | . 90   | NOP
00401047 | . 90   | NOP
00401048 | . 8D4410 18 | LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+EDX+18]
```

Moving down, the pointer to the PE header is moved to *EAX* by adding 0x3C to our image base offset. Adding 0x3C to the Image base will point to MZ's *DOS_PEOffset* value. It's always at 0x3C offset, so it's hardcoded into the application code. However, the *SizeOfOptionalHeader* may vary, so it takes its value *EDX* by adding 0x14 to the *EAX* pointer.

Then using *LEA*, a sum of *DOS_PEOffset* (*EAX*), plus *SizeOfOptionalHeader* (*EDX*), plus 0x18 (size of the PE header which is also a constant value) we get the beginning of the PE sections.

```
0040104F | . 8B40 34 | MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+34]
```

By adding 0x34 to the current pointer in *EAX* (pointing at the beginning of the PE sections), the program skips the PE header, the first ".text" section, and takes the *VirtualAddress* of the second ".data" section.

```
00401052 | . 03C3 | ADD EAX,EBX
00401054 | . 05 F6070000 | ADD EAX,7F6
```

To the ".data" section *VirtualAddress* is then added the *ImageBase* in *EBX*, and *EAX* will hold a

pointer to the beginning of “.data” section where the encryptor Import Table begins. Then, by adding 0x7F6 to *EAX*, the *Import Table* will be skipped, so *EAX* will point to the beginning of the next code chunk.

```

0040108A . 91 XCHG EAX, ECX
0040108B . 90 NOP
0040108C . 90 NOP
0040108D . 51 PUSH ECX
0040108E . 33CB XOR ECX, EBX
00401090 . 8BCC MOV ECX, ESP
00401092 . 90 NOP
00401093 . 83C4 04 ADD ESP, 4
00401096 . 90 NOP
00401097 . 90 NOP
00401098 . FF7424 FC PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[ESP-4]
0040109C . 90 NOP
0040109D . 90 NOP
0040109E . 90 NOP
0040109F . C3 RETN

```

Few lines before the *RETN* instruction, *EAX* and *ECX* values get exchanged, then *ECX* is pushed to the stack.

At the end, *PUSH [ESP-4]* store the return address that *ECX* point at, to the stack.

Here, the code saves the register values by *PUSHAD*, and jumps to 00405809.

```

004057F6 60 PUSHAD
004057F7 7E 10 JMP SHORT buritos.00405809

```

At 00405809 a *CALL*, followed by most probably encrypted code is executed.

```

00405809 E8 8C000000 CALL buritos.0040589A
0040580E 95 XCHG EAX, EBP
0040580F D9A8 81C3ACCF FLDCW WORD PTR DS:[EAX+CFACC381]
00405815 9C PUSHFD
00405816 C8 61846A ENTER 8461, 6A
0040581A B5 42 MOV CH, 42
0040581C B3 30 MOV BL, 30
0040581E 4B DEC EBX
0040581F 1F POP DS
00405820 48 DEC EAX
00405821 322A XOR CH, BYTE PTR DS:[EDX]
00405823 93 XCHG EAX, EBX
00405824 AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00405825 7E 37 LOOPD SHORT buritos.0040585E
00405827 80A7 8A8A3213 61 AND BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+13328A8A], 6A
0040582E DFD9 FISTP ECX

```

I'll step into that call to see what's going on there.

```

0040589A 90 NOP
0040589B 5A POP EDX
0040589D 53 PUSH EBX
0040589F BB 34000000 MOV EBX, 34
004058A5 8DB49A BE000000 LEA ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+EBX*4+BE]
004058AE 33FF XOR EDI, EDI
004058B3 33FE XOR EDI, ESI
004058B9 AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
004058BB 40 INC EAX
004058BD 83E8 01 SUB EAX, 1
004058C0 05 3A8D5A23 ADD EAX, 235A8D3A
004058C7 AB STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
004058CA 4B DEC EBX
004058CC 8BC3 MOV EAX, EBX
004058CE 75 E9 JNZ SHORT buritos.004058B9
004058D0 53 PUSH EBX
004058D1 C1A9 6CC203D1 D1 SHR DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+D103C26C], 0D7

```

(BULK NOP INSTRUCTIONS REMOVED FROM THE IMAGE!)

First, the return address is *POP*-ed into *EDX*. *EBX* is replaced with 0x34 and finally *EDX+EBX*4+0xBE* goes to *ESI*.

A two *XOR* instructions *EDI,EDI* and *EDI,ESI*, can be described as *MOV EDI,ESI*

implementation, so both *EDI* and *ESI* contain the address 0040599C, which point to the end of the encrypted code.

Now I know the end of the encrypted code, and the next *JNZ* loop could give me an idea for the beginning. There are *LODS* and *STOS* instructions, that will move data "TO" and then "FROM" *EAX*.

EBX still contains 0x34, gets decreased and then checked by *JNZ* (that's why *EBX* gets moved to *EAX* before the *JNZ* instruction), and since *LODS* and *STOS* use *DWORDs*, I should multiply 0x34 by 4 (1 *DWORD* = 4 *BYTE*) to get the encrypted code chunk size in bytes.

Then, $0x34 * 0x04 = 0xD0$, and since the end of the encrypted code is 0x0040599C, by subtracting 0xD0 from 0x0040599C, the result 0x004058CC will be the beginning address. But, because 0040599C is actually the beginning of the final encoded *DWORD*, I should add 4 to it, and also add 4 to the beginning address 004058CC too.

Finally, that code will decrypt everything between 0x004058D0 and 0x004059A0.

Now after I know both the encrypted code beginning and ending, I'll take a look at the "decryption" routine between *LODS* and *STOS*.

As I said, the instruction *LODS* loads a *DWORD* into the *EAX* register from the operand. Then *EAX* gets increased by one, then 1 gets subtracted from it. Obviously that's a bulk code, put there probably to fool the Antivirus fingerprinting technique.

Next a value of 0x235A8D3A gets added to *EAX* and finally *EAX* is put back where it was by *STOS*.

So the "encryption" is a simple add obfuscation, again designed to fool the AV.

Because it will decrypt the instructions after the *JNZ* at 004058CE, setting a regular breakpoint won't work, so I'll set "*Hardware on execution*" at the next address 004058D0, and run the program.

And the code get decrypted:

00405800	8D4E 04	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+4]
00405804	FC	CLD
00405806	2BFB	SUB EDI,EBX
0040580A	8BF9	MOV EDI,ECX
0040580D	F7D3	NOT EBX
004058E0	5B	POP EBX
004058E2	41	INC ECX
004058E5	81EF 36000000	SUB EDI,36
004058EC	33C9	XOR ECX,ECX
004058EF	B9 23000000	MOV ECX,23
004058F6	B8 C05244E1	MOV EAX,E14452C0
004058FB	FD	STD
004058FE	AF	SCAS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
00405901	3107	XOR DWORD PTR DS:[EDI],EAX
00405905	6A 04	PUSH 4
00405908	032424	ADD ESP,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP]
0040590B	FC	CLD
0040590E	^E2 EB	LOOPD SHORT buritos.004058FB
00405910	8BEF	MOV EBP,EDI
00405912	B9 A8140000	MOV ECX,14A8

First *LEA* instruction here will take a pointer at *ESI+4*.

ESI is the beginning of the decrypted code - 0x004058CC. So it adds 4(what the *DWORD* value length is), and finally *ECX* gets the current address - 004058D0.

Then subtract 0x36 from *EDI*, (holding *ECX*'s value) and *EDI* is now 0040589A. That's a line before the beginning address, where the first decryptor was.

The rest of the code is another decryption loop, this time using *XOR*.

Instruction *SCAS* at 004058FE first takes a *DWORD* from 0040589A then it *XOR* it with 0xE14452C0 (moved few lines above into *EAX*).

This decryption loop ends with *LOOPD* instruction, that use the default assembler counter *ECX*, then every time *LOOPD* gets executed, *ECX*'s value get decreased by 1.

At 004058EF 0x23 is moved to *ECX* register, and that's how much times the loop will be executed. Therefore, I'll take the end address 0040589A, that will get decoded, subtract 0x23 *DWORDS* (or 0x23*4), and the result 0040580E will be the beginning address of the code that will be decrypted here.

Again I'll place a hardware breakpoint after the *LOOPD* instruction and execute the code.

Right after the *LOOPD*, the value of *EDI* (0040580E, starting address of the decrypted code) gets moved into *EBP*, and 0x14A8 is moved to *ECX*.

```
00405952 90          NOP
00405953 FF D5      CALL EBP
00405955 90          NOP
```

Few lines down, at address 00405953 a *CALL EBP* will execute the code that was just decrypted.

But lets see what we have before that *CALL EBP*.

```
00405912 B9 A8140000 MOV ECX, 14A8
0040591A 8DBC39 51010000 LEA EDI, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+EDI+151]
00405923 C1E9 03     SHR ECX, 3
00405927 FD         STD
00405928 83EF 08     SUB EDI, 8
0040592D 68 31FE6119 PUSH 1961FE31
00405934 68 53063F61 PUSH 613F0653
0040593B 68 FB744861 PUSH 614874FB
00405942 68 A832AB81 PUSH 81AB32A8
00405949 54         PUSH ESP
0040594B 6A 08     PUSH 8
00405950 57         PUSH EDI
```

As I mentioned, *ECX* gets 0x14A8. Then at 0040591A, *EDI* gets a pointer from *EDI+ECX+0x151*.

EDI holds 0040580E (beginning address of the decoded code), so adding 0x14A8 (in *ECX*) plus 0x151 to it, will produce the value 00406E07.

Next *ECX* gets shifted left by 3 to become 0x295, and 8 get subtracted from *EDI*, so it's 00406DFF now.

The lines below are a few *PUSH* instructions, that will fill the stack with 0x1961FE31, 0x613F0653, 0x614874FB, 0x81AB32A8, *ESP*'s value, 8 and *EDI*'s value - in that order. Then it's the *CALL EBP*, so lets trace into it.

It start here:

```
0040580E 55          PUSH EBP
0040580F 8BEC      MOV EBP, ESP
00405811 60          PUSHAD
```

and ends here:

```
00405895 61          POPAD
00405896 C9          LEAVE
00405897 C2 0C00     RETN 0C
```

There are two loops in here, that again decrypt part of the code, this time using *XOR*, *SUB*, *SHR/L*, etc. and I really don't want to get in details about them, so I'll just "Execute till return" this code to get out of the *CALL*.

And back to 0012FF78...

00405953	FFD5	CALL EBP
00405955	90	NOP
00405956	90	NOP
00405957	83C4 10	ADD ESP,10
0040595A	90	NOP
0040595B	90	NOP
0040595C	49	DEC ECX
0040595D	^75 C9	JNZ SHORT buritos.00405928
0040595F	^73 E5	JNB SHORT buritos.00405946
00405961	1D 15652072	SBB EAX,72206515
00405966	95	XCHG EAX,EBP
00405967	A2 2CA4DCA2	MOV BYTE PTR DS:[A2DCA42C],AL
0040596C	3E:FC	CLD
0040596E	8F	???

It seems like this is another loop, executing *CALL EBP* and using *ECX* as counter. Before the loop beginning, *ECX* was 0x295, so that's how much times *CALL EBP* will be run. I'll again put a hardware breakpoint, this time at 0040595F, where the loop ends and executes the code.

0040595F	90	NOP
00405960	B8 F3040065	MOV EAX,650004F3
00405967	BA EF030000	MOV EDX,3EF
0040596D	57	PUSH EDI
0040596F	33C9	XOR ECX,ECX
00405972	81F1 75140000	XOR ECX,1475
00405979	8D7C39 39	LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+EDI+39]
0040597F	3007	XOR BYTE PTR DS:[EDI],AL
00405983	FE0F	DEC BYTE PTR DS:[EDI]
00405986	C1C0 03	ROL EAX,3
0040598A	AE	SCAS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]
0040598C	49	DEC ECX
0040598F	^75 EE	JNZ SHORT buritos.0040597F
00405991	90	NOP
00405992	5F	POP EDI
00405993	90	NOP
00405994	4A	DEC EDX
00405995	90	NOP
00405996	90	NOP
00405997	^75 D4	JNZ SHORT buritos.0040596D
00405999	√76 62	JBE SHORT buritos.004059FD
0040599B	B1 4B	MOV CL,4B
0040599D	DCCA	FMUL ST(2),ST

Another decrypt routine was decoded. It has two loops, inner - between 0040597F and 0040598F and outer - between 0040596D and 00405997. It uses hardcoded values like 0x650004F3, 0x3EF and 0x1475 to decode the next part, and I'll again put a hardware breakpoint after the outer loop, at address 00405999 and execute the decryptor.

00405999	61	POPAD
0040599A	FC	CLD
0040599B	√E9 CF020000	JMP buritos.00405C6F

It looks like this was the last decoding routine, so let's take a quick look at the decoded ".data" section in the memory.

```

D Dump - buritos:.data 00405000..0040BFFF
00405960 B8 F3 04 00 65 90 90 BA EF 03 00 00 90 57 90 33
00405970 C9 90 81 F1 75 14 00 00 90 80 7C 39 39 90 90 30
00405980 07 90 90 FE 0F 90 C1 C0 03 90 AE 90 49 90 90 75
00405990 EE 90 5F 90 4A 90 90 75 04 61 FC E9 CF 02 00 00
004059A0 4C 69 67 68 74 79 20 43 6F 6D 70 72 65 73 73 6F
004059B0 72 00 16 0E 00 00 00 1C 8F 75 00 26 00 00 E4 38
004059C0 6D 0E 00 00 00 00 55 8B EC 60 33 C0 8B 55 08 8B
004059D0 4D 0C 3B C8 75 0A 8B FA AE 75 FD 4F 8B CF 2B CA
004059E0 F7 00 32 02 42 B3 08 D1 E8 73 05 35 20 83 B8 ED
004059F0 FE CB 75 F3 E2 EC F7 00 89 44 24 1C 61 C9 C2 08
00405A00 00 55 8B EC 83 C4 E4 60 64 8B 15 30 00 00 8B
00405A10 52 0C 8B 52 0C 8B 12 80 7D E7 8B 72 30 B9 0D 00
00405A20 00 00 66 AD AA 66 0B C0 74 02 E2 F6 B9 0D 00 00
00405A30 00 8D 75 E7 8D 7D E7 AC 3C 41 72 06 3C 5A 77 02
00405A40 04 20 AA E2 F2 81 7D E7 6B 65 72 6E 75 C7 81 7D
00405A50 EB 65 6C 33 32 75 BE 81 7D EF 2E 64 6C 6C 75 B5
00405A60 80 7D F3 00 75 AF 8B 42 18 8B D8 03 40 3C 8B 40
00405A70 78 03 C3 8D 70 1C 8D 7D F4 B9 03 00 00 00 AD 03
00405A80 C3 AB E2 FA 8B 75 F8 BA FF FF FF FF 42 AD 03 C3
00405A90 6A 00 50 E8 2E FF FF FF 39 45 08 75 EF D1 E2 03
  
```

Looks like I'm getting closer to Lighty's code, so I'll follow the *JMP* to 00405C6F.

```

00405C6F 55          PUSH EBP
00405C70 8BEC       MOV EBP,ESP
00405C72 83C4 F4    ADD ESP,-0C
00405C75 60        PUSHAD
00405C76 33C0       XOR EAX,EAX
00405C78 50        PUSH EAX
00405C79 68 A8EDF2CE PUSH CEF2EDA8
00405C7E E8 7EFDFFFF CALL buritos.00405A01
00405C83 FFD0       CALL EAX
  
```

Most probably that's the original “*Lighty compressor*” entry point.

The first *CALL* here is at address 00405C7E leading to 00405A01, probably takes two parameters - 0xCEF2EDA8 and *EAX* (previously *XOR*-ed), so I'll follow it.

```

00405A01 55          PUSH EBP
00405A02 8BEC       MOV EBP,ESP
00405A04 83C4 E4    ADD ESP,-1C
00405A07 60        PUSHAD
00405A08 64:8B15 30000000 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR FS:[30]
00405A0F 8B52 0C    MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+C]
00405A12 8B52 0C    MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+C]
00405A15 8B12       MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX]
00405A17 8D7D E7    LEA EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-19]
00405A1A 8B72 30    MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+30]
00405A1D B9 0D000000 MOV ECX,0D
00405A22 66:AD      LODS WORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00405A24 AA        STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]
00405A25 66:0BC0    OR AX,AX
00405A28 v74 02    JE SHORT buritos.00405A2C
00405A2A ^E2 F6    LOOPD SHORT buritos.00405A22
  
```

At address 00405A08, a pointer to the Windows *PEB* structure is moved to *EAX*. This structure is officially undocumented, but lots of malware authors (and lately, not only...) use it.

You may learn more about PEB and other undocumented functions, methods and structures from <http://undocumented.ntinternals.net/>.

So, *FS[30]* points to the *PEB* structure. By using the *ntinternals.net* documentation, if I count right, *EDX+C* is the pointer to the *PEB*'s *LoaderData* which is a *PPEB_LDR_DATA* structure. Then there is another *EDX+C* that points to the *PPEB_LDR_DATA*'s *InLoadOrderModuleList* - a *LDR_MODULE* structure.

A pointer to *LDR_MODULE*'s *InLoadOrderModuleList* entry is taken in *EDX*. It's again a *LDR_MODULE* structure and finally from that structure *HashTableEntry* is taken by *EDX+30* at address 00405A1A.

The things are getting clear now. In *ESI* is the pointer to *HashTableEntry* to the modules loaded by our application.

A *LODS-STOS* routine in a loop by *LOOPD* gets executed, and *ECX* is 0x0D. So the code here will get a loaded library name from the *HashTableEntry* and store it to the buffer pointed by *EDI*.

```
00405A1A 8B72 30 MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+30] ntdll.7C9226A4
```

```
DS:[00241F78]=7C9226A4 (ntdll.7C9226A4), UNICODE "ntdll.dll"
ESI=FFFFFFFF
```

In my case, the first loaded module is "*ntdll.dll*".

```
00405A2C B9 0D000000 MOV ECX,0D
00405A31 8D75 E7 LEA ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-19]
00405A34 8D7D E7 LEA EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-19]
00405A37 AC LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
00405A38 3C 41 CMP AL,41
00405A3A 72 06 JB SHORT buritos.00405A42
00405A3C 3C 5A CMP AL,5A
00405A3E 77 02 JA SHORT buritos.00405A42
00405A40 04 20 ADD AL,20
00405A42 AA STOS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]
00405A43 E2 F2 LOOPD SHORT buritos.00405A37
```

Another *LOOPD* loop is executed. This one looks like a string-to-lower implementation.

It takes a letter from the "*ntdll.dll*" string in *ESI* and compare it with 0x41 and 0x5A. If the letter's ASCII value is between these two, it will add 0x20, to convert it to lowercase letter.

```
00405A45 817D E7 6B657261 CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-19],6E72656B
00405A4C 75 C7 JNZ SHORT buritos.00405A15
00405A4E 817D EB 656C3333 CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-15],32336C65
00405A55 75 BE JNZ SHORT buritos.00405A15
00405A57 817D EF 2E646C61 CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-11],6C6C642E
00405A5E 75 B5 JNZ SHORT buritos.00405A15
00405A60 8D7D F3 00 CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-01],0
00405A64 75 AF JNZ SHORT buritos.00405A15
```

Here, *EBP-19* holds a pointer to the loaded library name, that just gets converted to lowercase - in my case "*ntdll.dll*". The comparison get its first *DWORD* value, or "*ntdl*" and compare it with 0x6E72656B. Then the second *DWORD* "*.dll*" is compared with 0x32336C65, the third, which for "*ntdll.dll*" is "*l*" is compared with 0x6C6C642E, and finally the last byte is compared with 0.

So let's convert these *DWORD* values to letters.

0x6E72656B is "*nrek*", 0x32336C65 - "*23le*" and 0x6C6C642E is "*lld*". Obviously this checks if the current loaded library (taken from *PEB*) is "*kernel32.dll*".

Well right now it's not so I'll continue by jumping back to address 00405A15, to take the next loaded library.

When the "*kernel32.dll*" is found the code continues here:

```
00405A66 8B42 18 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+18]
00405A69 8B08 MOV EBX,EAX
00405A6B 0340 3C ADD EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+3C]
00405A6E 8B40 78 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+78]
00405A71 03C3 ADD EAX,EBX
00405A73 8D70 1C LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+1C]
00405A76 8D7D F4 LEA EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
```

EDX contains the *InLoadOrderModuleList*'s *LDR_MODULE* structure. On address 00405A66, *EAX* takes the module's *BaseAddress*, pointed by *EDX+18*, then moves it to *EBX* on the next line.

The rest few lines between 00405A6B and 00405A76 will "parse" the loaded module.

First, at 00405A6B the pointer is moved to the PE signature offset.

Then the Export address is taken by *EAX+78*, and added to *EBX* (pointing to the module's *BaseAddress*).

```

00405A84 8B75 F8      MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00405A87 BA FFFFFFFF  MOV EDX,-1
00405A8C 42          INC EDX
00405A8D AD          LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00405A8E 03C3       ADD EAX,EBX
00405A90 6A 00      PUSH 0
00405A92 50        PUSH EAX
00405A93 E8 2EFFFFFF CALL buritos.004059C6
00405A98 3945 08    CMP DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8],EAX
00405A9B ^75 EF     JNZ SHORT buritos.00405A8C

```

At address 00405A8D, a *DWORD* value from *ESI* is taken. Now *ESI* points to the export table of kernel32. By adding the *BaseAddress* to it, a pointer to the name of export function from kernel32.dll is moved in *EAX*.

The loop between address 00405A8C and 00405A9B will pass the function name as first argument to *CALL 004059C6*, and compare the result with the current *CALL* Argument *EBP+8*, that was 0xCEF2EDA8. Depending on the result, it will continue through the rest of the exports of kernel32 until it finds the needed one.

Let's take a look at *CALL 004059C6* contents.

```

004059C6 55        PUSH EBP
004059C7 8BEC     MOV EBP,ESP
004059C9 60      PUSHAD
004059CA 33C0     XOR EAX,EAX
004059CC 8B55 08  MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
004059CF 8B4D 0C  MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]
004059D2 3BC8     CMP ECX,EAX
004059D4 ^75 0A    JNZ SHORT buritos.004059E0
004059D6 8BFA     MOV EDI,EDX
004059D8 AE       SCAS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]
004059D9 ^75 FD    JNZ SHORT buritos.004059D8
004059DB 4F       DEC EDI
004059DC 8BCF     MOV ECX,EDI
004059DE 2BCA     SUB ECX,EDX
004059E0 F7D0     NOT EAX
004059E2 3202     XOR AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX]
004059E4 42       INC EDX
004059E5 B3 08    MOV BL,8
004059E7 D1E8     SHR EAX,1
004059E9 ^73 05    JNB SHORT buritos.004059F0
004059EB 35 2083B8ED XOR EAX,EDB88320
004059F0 FECB     DEC BL
004059F2 ^75 F3    JNZ SHORT buritos.004059E7
004059F4 ^E2 EC    LOOPD SHORT buritos.004059E2
004059F6 F7D0     NOT EAX
004059F8 894424 1C MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+1C],EAX
004059FC 61      POPAD
004059FD C9      LEAVE
004059FE C2 0800  RETN 8

```

Looks like a hashing algorithm to me.

As this is the first time I enter this *CALL*, it's first argument is pointing to "ActivateActCtx" export function of kernel32.

First at address 004059CC, *EDX* takes the first argument or pointer to "ActivateActCtx". On the next line, *ECX* takes the second one which was 0.

Then if *ECX* is different from 0, it takes the jump, but since it's not, it will continue.

The *JNZ* loop between 004059D8 and 004059D9 will take every character from "ActivateActCtx", then by *DEC EDI*, *MOV ECX,EDI* and *SUB ECX,EDX* the string's length is taken. So knowing that I could say the second argument of *CALL 004059C6* is the length of the first argument passed, in that case "ActivateActCtx". If the length passed is 0, the loop will determine it by searching for a string termination 0.

Then if binary data is passed to that function, its length should be previously specified because it can contain zeros.

Next *EAX* gets *NOT*-ed and it's lower byte gets *XOR*-ed with the first symbol of "ActivateActCtx". The result of *EAX* is then shifted right with 1 and checked by *JNB* at 004059E9.

This looks like a "is integer signed" check. Depending on the result, *EAX* may get *XOR*-ed with 0xEDB88320 if its content is negative number (bigger than 0x7FFFFFFF).

Then a inner loop between 004059E7 and 004059F2 will get executed 8 times (*BL* is the counter here), and keep shifting left *EAX*.

When the inner loop ends, the outer one will continue the same procedure for the rest of the "ActivateActCtx" letters.

Finally at address 004059F6, *EAX* get *NOT*-ed and stored into *ESP+1C*. So, the hashed value of "ActivateActCtx" will be 0x6AA0C20C.

So *CALL 004059C6* is indeed a hashing algorithm so I'll note that.

00405A9D	D1E2	SHL EDX, 1	
00405A9F	0355 FC	ADD EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]	
00405AA2	0FB702	MOVZX EAX, WORD PTR DS:[EDX]	
00405AA5	C1E0 02	SHL EAX, 2	
00405AA8	0345 F4	ADD EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]	
00405AAB	8B00	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]	
00405AAD	03C3	ADD EAX, EBX	
00405AAF	894424 1C	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+1C], EAX	kernel32.Sleep
00405AB3	61	POPAD	
00405AB4	C9	LEAVE	
00405AB5	C2 0400	RETN 4	

The rest of these instructions will get the entry point of the requested API function from kernel32 and at 00405AAF, the call will be obviously to the kernel's Sleep function.

As this is the end of *CALL 00405A01*, I can call it a *GetProcAddress* implementation, that will return a handle to kernel32's API function, defined by the first given argument.

00405C76	33C0	XOR EAX, EAX	
00405C78	50	PUSH EAX	
00405C79	68 A8EDF2CE	PUSH CEF2EDA8	
00405C7E	E8 7EFDFFFF	CALL buritos.00405A01	
00405C83	FFD0	CALL EAX	kernel32.Sleep
00405C85	0BC0	OR EAX, EAX	
00405C87	0F85 5F030000	JNZ buritos.00405FEC	
00405C8D	E8 E7FEFFFF	CALL buritos.00405B79	

Back to address 00405C83, *Sleep(0)* is executed. The zero actually comes from that *PUSH EAX* (previously *XOR*-ed) at 00405C78, so that *GetProcAddress* implementation has only one parameter.

I found that *Sleep(0)* quite strange. According to the official MSDN documentation, *Sleep* does not return a value, but here its result gets *OR*-ed, and depending on the result, the code will jump or continue.

In my case, when I execute the *Sleep(0)*, the result in *EAX* is 0, and the code continues without jumping to 00405FEC. However, if in any case the program jumps to 00405FEC, an *ExitProcess* will be executed and the program will be terminated, so I guess this is some kind of a debugging protection. I'll be happy to learn more about this, so anyone knowing more can contact me and give me a quick reference. ;)

The next thing that I will take a notice on is this *CALL* at address 00405C8D.

00405B79	60	PUSHAD	
00405B7A	E8 00000000	CALL buritos.00405B7F	
00405B7F	5B	POP EBX	
00405B80	81EB EF194000	SUB EBX, buritos.004019EF	
00405B86	E8 4D000000	CALL buritos.00405BD8	
00405B88	8B4424 0C	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C]	
00405B8F	FF80 B8000000	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+B8]	
00405B95	FF80 B8000000	INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+B8]	
00405B98	33C0	XOR EAX, EAX	
00405B9D	C2 1000	RETN 10	

There, the first *CALL* is referring to the next address 00405B7F and it's there to take the current *EIP* into *EBX* (by *POP*-ing it to *EBX*). Then from *EBX* is subtracted 0x004019EF and *EBX* now

holds 0x4190.

Let's now take a look at the second `CALL`.

```

00405B08 64:FF35 00000000 PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[0]
00405B0F 64:8925 00000000 MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0],ESP
00405B16 83EC 08 SUB ESP,8
00405B19 8DBB 101A4000 LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401A10]
00405B1C 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI],EAX
00405B1F CC INT3
00405B20 90 NOP
00405B21 B9 04000000 MOV ECX,4
00405B24 0F31 RDTSC
00405B27 890424 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EAX
00405B2A 895424 04 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4],EDX
00405C01 CC INT3
00405C02 90 NOP
00405C03 0F31 RDTSC
00405C05 2B0424 SUB EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP]
00405C08 1B5424 04 SBB EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]
00405C0B 8907 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI],EAX
00405C0E 8957 04 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+4],EDX
00405C11 AF SCAS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
00405C12 AF SCAS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
00405C13 ^E2 EE LOOPD SHORT buritos.00405C03
00405C15 83C4 08 ADD ESP,8

```

These two `INT 3` at address 00405B1F and 00405C01 will break my debugger, so I should definitely `NOP` them.

The `RDTSC` instruction will take a *Time Stamp Counter* into `EDX` and `EAX`, and the results then get moved to the stack. All this instructions are probably part of a debugging protection (by counting the time needed to execute a portion of code, and then decide if it was too slow - "*debugged*" or not - "*not debugged*").

So to pass them up, I will try to `NOP` the `INT 3`, put a hardware breakpoint at address 00405C15 where `LOOPD` ends, and execute the code.

But first, let's check the rest of the code.

```

00405C15 83C4 08 ADD ESP,8
00405C18 64:8F05 00000000 POP DWORD PTR FS:[0]
00405C1F 83C4 04 ADD ESP,4
00405C22 9B WAIT
00405C23 DBE3 FINIT
00405C25 B9 04000000 MOV ECX,4
00405C28 8DB3 101A4000 LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401A10]
00405C30 DD83 301A4000 FLD QWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401A30]
00405C36 DF2E FILD QWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00405C38 D8D1 FCOM ST(1)
00405C3A 9B WAIT
00405C3B DFE0 FSTSW AX
00405C3D 66:A9 0001 TEST AX,100
00405C41 v74 02 JE SHORT buritos.00405C45
00405C43 D9C9 FXCH ST(1)
00405C45 DDD8 FSTP ST
00405C47 83C6 08 ADD ESI,8
00405C4A ^E2 EA LOOPD SHORT buritos.00405C36
00405C4C DC93 401A4000 FCOM QWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401A40]
00405C52 9B WAIT
00405C53 DFE0 FSTSW AX
00405C55 66:A9 0001 TEST AX,100
00405C59 v75 0F JNZ SHORT buritos.00405C6A
00405C5B DC93 381A4000 FCOM QWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401A38]
00405C61 9B WAIT
00405C62 DFE0 FSTSW AX
00405C64 66:A9 0001 TEST AX,100
00405C68 v75 01 JNZ SHORT buritos.00405C6B
00405C6A F4 HLT
00405C6B DDD8 FSTP ST
00405C6D 61 POPAD
00405C6E C3 RETN

```

There is another `LOOPD`, using the `FPU` instructions, and at the end of the code a `HLT` command at address 00405C6A. Executing that `HLT` means game over, and I don't want to start from the beginning again, so instead of putting a breakpoint after the first `LOOPD`, I will put one

after the *HLT* at 00405C6B, hoping that the program will execute fast enough without detecting the debugger.

Fortunately, my plan worked and I can leave the debug protection successfully through the *RETN* at 00405C6E.

```

00405C94 8B45 08      MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00405C97 48          DEC EAX
00405C98 25 00F0FFFF AND EAX,FFFFFF00
00405C9D 66:8138 4D5A    CMP WORD PTR DS:[EAX],5A4D
00405CA2 ^75 F3      JNZ SHORT buritos.00405C97
00405CA4 8945 08      MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8],EAX

```

A loop is searching for the current process “MZ” (0x5A4D) header, so at address 00405CA4, *EAX* will move its pointer to the *ImageBase*, to *EBP+8*.

```

00405CA7 E8 00000000 CALL buritos.00405CAC
00405CAC 812C24 1C1B4000 SUB DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],buritos.00401B1C
00405CB3 5B          POP EBX
00405CB4 B9 58060000 MOV ECX,658
00405CB9 038B 22184000 ADD ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401822]
00405CBF 894D F8      MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8],ECX

```

At 00405CA7, the *CALL* is used to take the current *EIP*. Then from the stack's last entry (where the current *EIP* is) is subtracted 0x00401B1C. The result - 0x4190 is *POP*-ed to *EBX* and later used as offset value with the address 00401822.

Adding 0x4190 to 00401822 will point here:

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00405992	5F 90 4A 90 90 75 D4 61 FC E9 CF 02 00 00 4C 69	_PJPPu ƒaƒwƒθ..Li
004059A2	67 68 74 79 20 43 6F 6D 70 72 65 73 73 6F 72 00	ghty Compressor.
004059B2	16 0E 00 00 D0 1C 8F 75 00 26 00 00 E4 38 6D 0E	..LПu.&..ø8m#
004059C2	00 00 00 00 55 8B EC 60 33 C0 8B 55 08 8B 4D 0CУлЬ'3'лЛлЛл.
004059D2	3B C8 75 0A 8B FA AE 75 FD 4F 8B CF 2B CA F7 D0	;ь.л·ou#0лƒ+ьь
004059E2	32 02 42 B3 08 D1 E8 73 05 35 20 83 B8 ED FE CB	20B Tws#5 Γэ#т

That's the *DWORD* right after the “Lighty compressor” string.

So 0xE16 is added to *ECX*, which is 0x658 and the result is 0x146E - moved to *EBP-8*.

```

00405CC2 6A 40      PUSH 40
00405CC4 68 00300000 PUSH 3000
00405CC9 51        PUSH ECX
00405CCA 6A 00      PUSH 0
00405CCC 68 4A0DCE09 PUSH 9CE0D4A
00405CD1 E8 E2FDFFFF CALL buritos.00405AB8

```

The next *CALL* to 00405AB8 is a wrapper over *CALL 00405A01* (which was a *GetProcAddress* analogue). Using *CALL 00405AB8*, will be like actually executing a kernel API function.

It has 5 arguments pushed to the stack. The last one is the hashed name of the API function taken by 00405A01, and the rest 4 arguments are the paramaters that will be passed to that API function.

To sort things up, if I have the following code:

```

PUSH 1000
PUSH CEF2EDA8
CALL buritos.00405AB8

```

it will execute *Sleep(0x1000)*, because as I already found out, 0xCEF2EDA8 equals the *Sleep* function, and 1000 will be the argument passed to this particular function.

Now let's take a look into that wrapper at 00405AB8

```

00405AB8 55          PUSH EBP
00405AB9 8BEC       MOV EBP,ESP
00405ABB FF75 08    PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00405ABE E8 3EFFFFFF CALL buritos.00405A01
00405AC3 C9        LEAVE
00405AC4 870424    XCHG DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EAX
00405AC7 874424 04    XCHG DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4],EAX
00405ACB C3        RETN

```

After the process address is taken, a *LEAVE* instruction follows, and two *XCHG*, that will exchange *EAX* value with the first and the second stack *DWORD*s.

By doing so, the *RETN* at 00405ACB will drop me into the current instruction entry point, so I'll step over the *CALL* to 00405A01 and look what *EAX* holds.

EAX 7C809A81 kernel32.VirtualAlloc

A *VirtualAlloc* handle, and by knowing the parameters 0x00, *ECX*, 0x3000 and 0x40 I can figure out what will be allocated, using the MSDN documentation:

```

LPVOID WINAPI VirtualAlloc(
    __in_opt LPVOID lpAddress,
    __in     SIZE_T dwSize,
    __in     DWORD flAllocationType,
    __in     DWORD flProtect
);

```

Then, *ECX* (0x0000146E) is the size that will be allocated, *flAllocationType* will be *MEM_COMMIT|MEM_RESERVE* (because 0x3000 means exactly that) and *flProtect* will be *PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE* (0x40), and *EAX* will hold the pointer to the newly allocated memory region.

As I mentioned before, the last two *XCHG* instructions are pointers to *kernel32.VirtualAlloc* function, and the current return address from this *CALL*.

```

0012FF74 7C809A81 kernel32.VirtualAlloc
0012FF78 00405CD6 RETURN to buritos.00405CD6 from buritos.00405AB8

```

Everything seems right, so I will put a breakpoint at the return address 00405CD6 and execute the *VirtualAlloc* function.

```

00405CD1 E8 E2FDFFFF CALL buritos.00405AB8
00405CD6 8945 FC    MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],EAX

```

The allocation was successful, and *EAX* now holds a pointer to the allocated space (in my case 00830000), that is saved to *ESP-4*.

```

00405CD9 8DB3 10184000 LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401810]
00405CDF 8B7D FC    MOV EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
00405CE2 8B4D F8    MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00405CE5 03DF      ADD EBX,EDI
00405CE7 2BDE      SUB EBX,ESI
00405CE9 F3:A4     REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
00405CEB 8D83 631B4000 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401B63]
00405CF1 FFE0     JMP EAX

```

At address 00405CD9, in *ESI* is moved the address of *EBX* (containing 0x4190) plus 00401810, that is pointing here:

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
004059A0	4C 69 67 68 74 79 20 43 6F 6D 70 72 65 73 73 6F	Lighty Compresso
004059B0	72 00 16 0E 00 00 D0 1C 8F 75 00 26 00 00 E4 38	r..Я..LПu.&..ø8
004059C0	6D 0E 00 00 00 00 55 8B EC 60 33 C0 8B 55 08 8B	мЯ....Уль'3'лUл

Then *EDI* takes the pointer of our newly allocated space 00830000, and *ECX* gets the value of 0x146E from *EBP-8*.

Few lines below a *REP MOVS* instruction, will move 0x146E bytes from where *ESI* points to the allocated space pointed by *EDI*.

Finally, *EAX* gets a pointer to 00830353 (*EBX*, now containing 0x0042E7F0 plus 0x00401B63) and jumps on that address by *JMP EAX* at 00405CF1.

```

00830353 8DB3 681E4000 LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401E68]
00830359 FFB3 22184000 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401822]
0083035F 56          PUSH ESI
00830360 E8 C1FCFFFF CALL 00830026
00830365 3B83 26184000 CMP EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+401826]
0083036B 0F85 DB020000 JNZ 0083064C
00830371 FFB3 2A184000 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+40182A]

```

Here, the first *CALL* to 00830026 does exactly what this on 004059C6 was doing - it hashes a string, so lets check the arguments.

```

0012FF84 00830658 RETURN to 00830658 from 00830118
0012FF88 00000E16

```

The first argument is *ESI*, and it holds a pointer to 00830658:

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00830658	4D 38 5A 90 38 03 66 02 04 09 71 FF 81 B8 C2 91	MSZP8*f0+.q ETTC
00830668	01 40 C2 15 C7 D0 08 5D 70 50 45 C2 08 4C 01 03	@T3 ""JpPE_TL0*
00830678	9E 14 70 E0 1C 02 01 0B 90 08 2B 1E E9 A1 E0 11	W9ppL00fF+u6p4
00830688	20 22 10 57 30 EE 40 0C 02 AE 1F 8E 08 D0 A2 0D	"W0W0.0oTC"b.

The highlighted bytes are actually the encrypted "MZ" header.

The second argument is 0xE16 and that was a length parameter. So, the function at 00830026 will create a checksum of this data.

I'll step over that call and lets see the next comparison at 00830365.

```

DS:[00830016]=758F1CD0
EAX=758F1CD0

```

Both value equals, but in case they don't match, the jump will be taken to *ExitProcess* function. The checksum is compared against a value stored at 00830016 (*EBX*+401826), pointing here:

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00830000	4C 69 67 68 74 79 20 43 6F 6D 70 72 65 73 73 6F	Lighty Compresso
00830010	72 00 16 0E 00 00 D0 1C 8F 75 00 26 00 00 E4 38	r...Lnu.&..ø8
00830020	6D 0E 00 00 00 00 55 8B EC 60 33 C0 8B 55 08 8B	m.Uлb'3'лuл
00830030	4D 0C 3B C8 75 0A 8B FA AE 75 FD 4F 8B CF 2B CA	M.;;u.л. ou#0лr+*

```

00830371 FFB3 2A184000 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+40182A]
00830377 6A 40          PUSH 40
00830379 68 3174BC7F   PUSH 7FBC7431
0083037E E8 95FDFFFF   CALL 00830118
00830383 8945 F4        MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C],EAX
00830386 0BC0          OR EAX,EAX
00830388 0F84 BE020000 JE 0083064C

```

The next call is again an API function call, this time with two parameters. Again like before, I'll step into the call to see what's the API function executed here, and this time it's a *GlobalAlloc* with parameters *uFlags* = *GPTR* and *dwBytes* = 0x2600. The *dwBytes* parameter is taken by *EBX*+40182A (0083001A) here:

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00830000	4C 69 67 68 74 79 20 43 6F 6D 70 72 65 73 73 6F	Lighty Compresso
00830010	72 00 16 0E 00 00 D0 1C 8F 75 00 26 00 00 E4 38	r...Lnu.&..ø8
00830020	6D 0E 00 00 00 00 55 8B EC 60 33 C0 8B 55 08 8B	m.Uлb'3'лuл
00830030	4D 0C 3B C8 75 0A 8B FA AE 75 FD 4F 8B CF 2B CA	M.;;u.л. ou#0лr+*

In my case, the memory gets allocated at 001429E0 and stored in *EBP*-C. Then the *GlobalAlloc* result is checked and if the memory cannot be allocated, the *JE* jumps to *ExitProcess*.

```

0083038E 8BF8          MOV EDI,EAX
00830390 56          PUSH ESI
00830391 57          PUSH EDI
00830392 E8 95FDFFFF   CALL 0083012C
00830397 3B83 2A184000 CMP EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+40182A]
0083039D 0F85 A9020000 JNZ 0083064C

```

The next *CALL* is to address 0083012C and it gets two parameters. The first one is the newly allocated by *GlobalAllocate* buffer, and the second one is the the beginning of the compressed "MZ" header at 00830658.

Looks like that *CALL* will uncompress the packed program, so I'll take a better look.

```

0083012C 55          PUSH EBP
0083012D 8BEC       MOV EBP,ESP
0083012F 60        PUSHAD
00830130 8B75 0C    MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]
00830133 8B7D 08    MOV EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00830136 FC        CLD
00830137 B2 80     MOV DL,80
00830139 33DB     XOR EBX,EBX
0083013B A4       MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
0083013C B3 02     MOV BL,2
0083013E E8 6D000000 CALL 008301B0
00830143 ^73 F6    JNB SHORT 0083013B
00830145 33C9     XOR ECX,ECX
00830147 E8 64000000 CALL 008301B0
0083014C v73 1C   JNB SHORT 0083016A
0083014E 33C0     XOR EAX,EAX


008301CC 2B7C24 28  SUB EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+28]
008301D0 897C24 1C  MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+1C],EDI
008301D4 61       POPAD
008301D5 C9       LEAVE
008301D6 C2 0800  RETN 8

```

The function is not that long, and I can use it to create an unpacker, so I'll save a copy of the code for later, but for now I'll just execute the decoding call, to get the unpacked data. After the unpacker *CALL*, a check compares the result of that call, with the size of the global allocated buffer, and if they match the code will continue down. However, if they don't, *JNZ* 0083064C will terminate the program with *ExitProcess*. Well, they do match, so let's take a look at what's just got decoded.

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
001429E0	4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00	MZP.*...*... ..
001429F0	B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	?.....@.....
00142A00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

The data is now unpacked in to the allocated by *GlobalAlloc* buffer, then I'll take a memory dump and view it in *PE Explorer's* disassembler.



Looks promising, but I don't want to be a party killer and spoil my own fun, so let's leave that for later and continue with the unpacking process.

```

008303A3 50        PUSH EAX
008303A4 57        PUSH EDI
008303A5 E8 7CFCFFFF CALL 00830026
008303AA 3B83 2E184000 CMP EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+40182E]
008303B0 v0F85 96020000 JNZ 0083064C

```

What's next? Another checksum, and this time for the uncompressed data. If the two checked values don't match, the program will be terminated again by *ExitProcess*.

The sum of *EBX+40182E* point to 0083001E:

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00830000	4C 69 67 68 74 79 20 43 6F 6D 70 72 65 73 73 6F	Lighty Compresso
00830010	72 00 16 0E 00 00 D0 1C 8F 75 00 26 00 00 E4 38	r...&...&...&8
00830020	6D 0E 00 00 00 00 55 8B EC 60 33 C0 8B 55 08 8B	m&...Uлb'3'лUл
00830030	4D 0C 3B C8 75 0A 8B FA AE 75 FD 4F 8B CF 2B CA	M.;'u.л.ou#0лF+*

And yet another *DWORD* has been decoded from *Lighty's* stub...

008303B6	8B4D F4	MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
008303B9	0349 3C	ADD ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+3C]
008303BC	6A 00	PUSH 0
008303BE	54	PUSH ESP
008303BF	6A 40	PUSH 40
008303C1	FF71 50	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+50]
008303C4	FF75 08	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
008303C7	68 2F6F0610	PUSH 10066F2F
008303CC	E8 47FDFFFF	CALL 00830118
008303D1	58	POP EAX
008303D2	EB 77	JMP SHORT 0083044B

Here, a API call with 5 parameters (six, if we include the 10066F2F, that define the API function).

At address 008303B6, *ECX* get a pointer to the global allocated memory – 001429E0. Adding 0x3C to it, will point to the uncompressed *DOS_PEOffset* value, and adding its value to *ECX* itself will make *ECX* pointing to the beginning of the *PE* header. Later, *ECX* is used at 008303C1, by adding 0x50 to it, that will point to the *PE's SizeOfImage* value, which is 0x5000. Used as first parameter to the API function, *ESP+8* holds the current *ImageBase* address - 0x00400000, and finally *ESP* used as forth parameter pointing at 0012FF74.

So, what's that API function?

EAX: 7C801AD0 kernel32.VirtualProtect

BOOL WINAPI VirtualProtect(

```

__in LPVOID lpAddress : current Image Base, 00400000
__in SIZE_T dwSize : Unpacked's SizeOfImage 0x5000;
__in DWORD flNewProtect : 0x40, or PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
__out PDWORD lplOldProtect : buffer DWORD, pointed by ESP
);

```

So that 0 pushed at address 008303BC is popped back to *EAX* at 008303D1 and it's not part of that API call.

0083044B	8B7D 08	MOV EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
0083044E	8B75 F4	MOV ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00830451	8BCE	MOV ECX,ESI
00830453	034E 3C	ADD ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+3C]
00830456	8B49 54	MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+54]
00830459	F3:A4	REP MOVS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
0083045B	8B5D 08	MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
0083045E	035B 3C	ADD EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+3C]
00830461	0FB74B 06	MOVZX ECX,WORD PTR DS:[EBX+6]
00830465	0FB773 14	MOVZX ESI,WORD PTR DS:[EBX+14]
00830469	8D741E 18	LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+EBX+18]

I already know that, *EBP+8* moved to *ESI*, holds the current *ImageBase* 00400000 and *EBP-C* moved to *ESI*, is the global allocated buffer, containing the uncompressed data of the original malware.

Then a *REP MOVS* at address 0083459, will move the data from the uncompressed malware, to the current image base address, overwriting the current process into the memory.

The instruction *REP* uses *ECX* as counter, so to determine how many bytes will be moved, I'll have to see what *ECX* will contain there.

First, *ECX* gets *ESI's* value - 001429E0. Then, *ESI+3C*, pointing at the *DOS_PEOffset* is added to *ECX*, and at 00830453, *ECX* will hold the beginning of the *PE* header.

Finally, *ECX* is replaced by *ECX+54* (pointing to *PE's SizeOfHeaders* value - in this case 0x400), and I now know that 0x400 bytes will be moved from the decoded data to the current image base. So, that *REP MOVSB* will move all the *MZ & PE* data, plus the *PE Sections*, and basically everything between the beginning of the file, and the beginning of its first - in this case ".data" section.

Then, the current *ImageBase* address is moved to *EBX*, and again using 0x3C as offset and adding it to *EBX*, at 0083045E will point to the current process *PE* header. A *MOVZX* to *ECX* will take the *PE's NumberOfSections*, and another *MOVZX*, this time to *ESI* takes the *PE's SizeOfOptionalHeader* value.

At the end, *ESI* takes a pointer to *SizeOfOptionalHeader+EBX+0x18*, that will point to the beginning of the *PE Sections* - ".text", ".data" and ".reloc".

```

0083046D 56          PUSH ESI
0083046E 51          PUSH ECX
0083046F 8B7D 08     MOV EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00830472 037E 0C     ADD EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+C]
00830475 8B4E 08     MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+8]
00830478 8B43 38     MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+38]
0083047B 48          DEC EAX
0083047C 03C8       ADD ECX,EAX
0083047E F7D0       NOT EAX
00830480 23C8       AND ECX,EAX
00830482 C1E9 02     SHR ECX,2
00830485 33C0       XOR EAX,EAX
00830487 F3:AB     REP STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
00830489 8B4E 10     MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+10]
0083048C 8B7E 0C     MOV EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+C]
0083048F 8B76 14     MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+14]
00830492 0375 F4     ADD ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00830495 037D 08     ADD EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00830498 F3:A4     REP MOVSB BYTE PTR ES:[EDI],BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
0083049A 59          POP ECX
0083049B 5E          POP ESI
0083049C 83C6 28     ADD ESI,28
0083049F ^E2 CC     LOOPD SHORT 0083046D

```

A loop using *REP MOVSB*, and a *ECX* counter (containing the *NumberOfSections*) will run three times, to transfer all three sections ".text", ".data", ".reloc" to the current process memory.

```

008304A1 FF75 F4     PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
008304A4 68 9D1E6B63 PUSH 636B1E9D
008304A9 E8 6AFCFFFF CALL 00830118
008304AE 8B8B 84000000 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+84]
008304B4 ^E3 66     JECXZ SHORT 0083051C

```

Another API call - this time *GlobalFree* will free the previously allocated memory at 001429E0. (I'll dump that buffer, before it gets freed because it contains the uncompressed malware and I can use it later to dump it in its original state.)

A *MOV* is taking the *IAT* size from the current process, stores it in *ECX* and then *JECXZ* is jumping depending on the *ECX* value.

In this case, the *IAT* size is 0x8C, so the jump will not be taken.

```

008304B6 8B9B 80000000 MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+80]
008304BC 035D 08     ADD EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]

```

EBX takes the *IAT* address, then the *ImageBase* is added to it, so *EBX* will point at the beginning of the *IAT*.

```

008304BF 8B73 0C MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+C]
008304C2 0BF6 OR ESI,ESI
008304C4 v74 56 JE SHORT 0083051C
008304C6 0375 08 ADD ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
008304C9 56 PUSH ESI
008304CA 68 706586B1 PUSH B1866570
008304CF E8 44FCFFFF CALL 00830118
008304D4 0BC0 OR EAX,EAX
008304D6 v75 0B JNZ SHORT 008304E3
008304D8 56 PUSH ESI
008304D9 68 8DBDC13F PUSH 3FC1BD8D
008304DE E8 35FCFFFF CALL 00830118
008304E3 8BD0 MOV EDX,EAX
008304E5 8B7B 10 MOV EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+10]
008304E8 8B33 MOV ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX]
008304EA 0BF6 OR ESI,ESI
008304EC v75 02 JNZ SHORT 008304F0
008304EE 8BF7 MOV ESI,EDI
008304F0 0375 08 ADD ESI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
008304F3 037D 08 ADD EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
008304F6 AD LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
008304F7 0BC0 OR EAX,EAX
008304F9 v74 1C JE SHORT 00830517
008304FB 0FBAF0 1F BTR EAX,1F
008304FF v72 05 JB SHORT 00830506
00830501 0345 08 ADD EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00830504 40 INC EAX
00830505 40 INC EAX
00830506 52 PUSH EDX
00830507 50 PUSH EAX
00830508 52 PUSH EDX
00830509 68 FF1F7CC9 PUSH C97C1FFF
0083050E E8 05FCFFFF CALL 00830118
00830513 5A POP EDX
00830514 AB STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
00830515 ^EB DF JMP SHORT 008304F6
00830517 83C3 14 ADD EBX,14
0083051A ^EB A3 JMP SHORT 008304BF
0083051C 8B55 08 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]

```

Two nested loops are executed here - inner from 008304F6 to 00830515 and outer from 008304BF to 0083051A.

Three API calls are executed here - at 0083050E (with parameter 0xC97C1FFF), 008304CF (taking 0xB1866570 as parameter) and 008304DE (with 0x3FC1BD8D as parameter) so I'll have to check them.

That first jump at address 008304C4 will take me right after the inner loop, so that's the loop terminator.

A *LODS-STOS* is also present, so there's some data moved here, but first things first.

Let's see all these calls and what will they do.

The first one at 008304CF, gets only one parameter and in the stack it says "*SHELL32.dll*".

EAX **7C80B529** kernel32.GetModuleHandleA

It's a *kernel32.GetModuleHandleA* call which will get the handle of "*SHELL32.dll*".

Then the second at 008304DE is executed only if the first one's result is *FALSE*. So if *GetModuleHandleA* fails:

EAX **7C801D77** kernel32.LoadLibraryA

a *LoadLibrary* is trying to get the library handle.

The last call at address 0083050E is a *kernel32.GetProcAddress*, on the first run taking the process address of *shell32*'s "*Shell_NotifyIconA*" function.

After the last *CALL*, the *STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]* at 00830514 will save the process address to a memory pointed by *EDI*, which in my case is the *IAT*:

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00401000	48 2C 00 00 56 2C 00 00 38 2C 00 00 26 2C 00 00	H,...U,...8,...&,...
00401010	16 2C 00 00 02 2C 00 00 F4 2B 00 00 00 00 00 00	...@...I+...
00401020	98 2B 00 00 A8 2B 00 00 B4 2B 00 00 82 2B 00 00	W+...w+...j+...B+...
00401030	D6 2B 00 00 76 2B 00 00 62 2B 00 00 54 2B 00 00	r+...v+...b+...T+...
00401040	4C 2B 00 00 40 2B 00 00 C6 2B 00 00 00 00 00 00	L+...@+...f+.....
00401050	E7 89 A3 7C 00 00 00 00 54 2D 00 00 00 00 00 00	4Ar!....T-.....
00401060	92 2C 00 00 A6 2C 00 00 B4 2C 00 00 C6 2C 00 00	T,...#,...j,...f...
00401070	7E 2C 00 00 E6 2C 00 00 F2 2C 00 00 02 2D 00 00	~...u...E...@-...
00401080	14 2D 00 00 D8 2C 00 00 72 2C 00 00 00 00 00 00	q!-...f...r.....
00401090	32 2D 00 00 00 00 00 00 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 61	2-.....http://a
004010A0	6E 74 69 73 70 79 77 61 72 65 2D 71 75 69 63 6B	nt ispyware-quick

Seems like, the whole idea of those loops is to fill the current *IAT* with the API function handles. This way the unpacked code can be run from the memory, without needing to reinitialize these handles.

So I'll put a breakpoint at 0083051C, right after the last loop jump and run the app.

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00401000	C3 CA DF 77 1B C4 DF 77 23 C1 DF 77 E7 EB DD 77	...w+...w#...w4b w
00401010	1B 76 DD 77 83 78 DD 77 F0 6B DD 77 00 00 00 00	+v wΓx wEk w...
00401020	2F 08 81 7C E0 C6 80 7C 67 23 80 7C 63 4C 81 7C	...B!pFA!g#A!cLB!
00401030	3F EB 80 7C B9 8F 83 7C 29 B5 80 7C A2 CA 81 7C	?wA!j!Π!j!A!E#B!
00401040	42 24 80 7C 29 C7 80 7C 31 03 91 7C 00 00 00 00	B\$A!)!A!1!C!....
00401050	E7 89 A3 7C 00 00 00 00 57 6F FA 77 00 00 00 00	4Ar!....Wo.w....
00401060	CE 8B D4 77 45 EA D6 77 0B 19 D5 77 16 23 D5 77	ifl twEτrwδ+fw#fw
00401070	BD BC D4 77 DE A2 D4 77 AE E2 D4 77 6B DF D4 77	"w wE wot wkw w
00401080	EB ED D6 77 FA E8 D4 77 AE 21 D5 77 00 00 00 00	wεrw w twof fw...
00401090	F5 99 2B 77 00 00 00 00 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 61	iW+w....http://a
004010A0	6E 74 69 73 70 79 77 61 72 65 2D 71 75 69 63 6B	nt ispyware-quick

All the handles are filled now.

```

0083051C 8B55 08      MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
0083051F 8B5D 08      MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00830522 035B 3C      ADD EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+3C]
00830525 2B53 34      SUB EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+34]
00830528 v74 4D      JE SHORT 00830577

```

Here, both *EDX* and *EBX* take a pointer to the current *ImageBase* - 00400000. *EBX* is then added to the the *PE's DOS_PEOffset* value, so *EBX* will point to *PE* header.

Then, from *EDX* (current *ImageBase*) is subtracted the overwritten *ImageBase*. Since both are 00400000, the *JE* to 00830577 will be taken. Most probably this is some compatibility check for compressed *DLL's* or applications with different than the standard 400000 *ImageBase*.

```

00830577 8B8B C4000000 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+C4]
0083057D vE3 60      JECXZ SHORT 008305DF

```

EBX+C4 points to the *PE's TLS_Table_size*, and then gets checked if equals zero. This application doesn't have a *TLS Table*, so the size is 0, and the jump to 008305DF is taken.

```

008305DF 64:A1 30000000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR FS:[30]
008305E5 8B40 0C      MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+C]
008305E8 8B40 0C      MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+C]
008305EB 8B48 18      MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+18]

```

Another *PEB* data reading is between 008305DF and 008305EB. The *PEB* pointer is taken in *EAX*. Then *EAX* gets a pointer to *PEB->LoaderData*, which was a *PPEB_LDR_DATA* structure. From that structure, in *EAX* is taken a pointer to *InLoadOrderModuleList* (a *LDR_MODULE* structure). And finally *ECX* stores the *BaseAddress* of the current image - 00400000. So *ECX* is the *BaseAddress* 00400000 and *EAX* is the *InLoadOrderModuleList->LDR_MODULE* pointer.

```

008305F1 3950 18 CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+18],EDX
008305F4 v74 07 JE SHORT 008305FD
008305F6 8B00 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
008305F8 3948 18 CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+18],ECX
008305FB ^75 F4 JNZ SHORT 008305F1
008305FD 8B5B 28 MOV EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+28]
00830600 035D 08 ADD EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
00830603 8958 1C MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+1C],EBX
00830606 895C24 1C MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+1C],EBX
0083060A 8B5D F8 MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
0083060D 895C24 18 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+18],EBX
00830611 8B5D FC MOV EBX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4]
00830614 895C24 14 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+14],EBX
00830618 61 POPAD
00830619 C9 LEAVE
0083061A 890424 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EAX
0083061D 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
0083061F C2 0400 RETN 4

```

I'm getting closer to the *RETN*, but what do we have here? A small loop between 008305F1 and 008305FB.

EAX is still holding the *PEB's LDR_MODULE* structure, so *EAX+18* will point to *LDR_MODULE's BaseAddress*, which is 00400000, just like the one *EDX* holds, so the jump will be taken to 008305FD.

Then at 008305FD, *EBX* is replaced by *EBX+28*. *EBX* is pointing at the current *PE* header, so adding 0x28 to it, will be the *AddressOfEntryPoint* value - in this case 0x2040.

EBP+8 is added to *EBX* and that builds the address 00402040 into *EBX*.

The *PEB's LDR_MODULE EntryPoint* is replaced then at 00830603, by *EBX*. Basically, The current process *EntryPoint* is set to 00402040.

Next, stack entries 8, 7 and 6, are replaced at 00830606, 0083060D and 00830614 with 00402040 (the new entry point), 0x146E (from *EBP-8*) and pointer to 00830000 (from *EBP-4*), where the virtual allocated space is.

```

0012FF8C 7C910738 ntdll.7C910738
0012FF90 FFFFFFFF
0012FF94 0012FFB8
0012FF98 0012FFAC
0012FF9C 7FFDF000
0012FFA0 00830000 ASCII "Lighty Compressor"
0012FFA4 0000146E
0012FFA8 00402040 buritos.00402040
0012FFAC 001429E0
0012FFB0 0000146E

```

A *POPAD* pops back the stack values to the registers *EAX*, *ECX* and *EDX*.

```

Registers (MMX)
EAX 00402040 buritos.00402040
ECX 0000146E
EDX 00830000 ASCII "Lighty Compressor"

```

Finally, the first stack value is replaced with *EAX* (the new entry point 00402040) and *RETN* sends me here:

```

00402040 55 DB 55
00402041 8B DB 8B
00402042 EC DB EC
00402043 81 DB 81
00402044 EC DB EC
00402045 10 DB 10
00402046 01 DB 01
00402047 00 DB 00
00402048 00 DB 00
00402049 E8 DB E8
0040204A F2 DB F2
0040204B 05 DB 05
0040204C 00 DB 00

```

Oh... *Ctrl+A*

```

00402040 . 55          PUSH EBP
00402041 . 8BEC       MOV EBP,ESP
00402043 . 81EC 10010000 SUB ESP,110
00402049 . E8 F2050000 CALL buritos.00402640
0040204E . 83F8 02    CMP EAX,2
00402051 . 74 0A     JE SHORT buritos.0040205D
00402053 . E8 68080000 CALL buritos.004028C0
00402058 . 83F8 01    CMP EAX,1
0040205B . 75 08     JNZ SHORT buritos.00402065
0040205D > 6A 00     PUSH 0
0040205F . FF15 3C104000 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[40103C]
00402065 > E8 26070000 CALL buritos.00402790
ExitCode = 0
ExitProcess

```

And that's the original malware entry point. Now I can make a dump and fix the *IAT* with *ImportRec*, and I did so, but

```

Size:          68,0 KB (69 632 bytes)
Size on disk: 68,0 KB (69 632 bytes)

```

that size, 68KB looks way too much. The file is working and can be analyzed as it is, but still, 68K?

I'll get rid of that fat dump, and rebuilt it myself from the memory dump, saved before *GlobalFree*-ing the memory holding it.

Because OllyDbg doesn't have a very flexible memory dumping functionality, the *MEM* file contain bulk data at the beginning and the end that I'll have to cut off.

The best way to determine where is the beginning of the program in that memory dump is to search for the "MZ" header like this:

```

OFFSET      00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
0000:29E0   4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00  M Z  ħ   □           □           × ×
0000:29F0   B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ē           @
0000:2A00   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

```

and everything before offset 0x29E0 should be removed.

As I said, there is bulk data at the end too, that is in fact not necessary to remove, but I'll do it anyway.

To get to the programs end I'll use the *GlobalAlloc* size parameter as file size, and it was 0x2600, so 0x29E0+0x2600 = offset 0x4FE0.

```

OFFSET      00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F  00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
0000:4FE0   AB AB AB AB AB AB AB AB 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  << << << << << << <<
0000:4FF0   02 02 C3 04 EE 14 EE 00 78 01 14 00 78 01 14 00  □ □ Γ □ ○ □ ○   x □ □   x □ □
0000:5000   EE FE  ○ × ○ × ○ × ○ × ○ × ○ × ○ × ○ × ○ ×

```

So removing the bulk data will produce a 9728 bytes long EXE – much less than the dumped one.

And that's all!

Unpacking "*Lighty Compressed*" files is not hard at all.

The laziest way is to set a breakpoint at *GlobalAlloc*, and *GlobalFree*. Then, when Olly breaks on *GlobalAlloc*, write down the Size argument. Run the application until *GlobalFree* breakpoint is triggered.

Save the memory buffer that will be freed, then strip the bulk data from the beginning and the end of the memory dump, and you will get the original, unpacked executable!

Appendix B: "Lighty compressor" CRC algorithm, C implementation

```
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main() {

    char data[] = "ActivateActCtx"; // data to get CRC'ed
    int i, j, t, data_length;
    unsigned int result = -1;

    data_length = strlen(data); // for binary data replace strlen with its size
    for (i = 0; i < data_length; i++) {
        result ^= data[i];
        for(j = 8; j > 0; j--) {
            t = result & 1;
            result >>= 1;
            if (t) {
                result ^= 0xEDB88320;
            }
        }
    }
    printf("%08X", ~result); // the result is NOT-ed
    return 0;
}
```

Appendix C: "Lighty compressor" Uncompressor, FASM implementation

```
format PE GUI 4.0
entry start

include 'win32ax.inc'

section '.data' data readable writeable

file_input          db "_00830000.mem",0    ; compressed data is here
file_output         db "unpacked.bin",0     ; the unpacked binary will be here
hwnd_file_input     dd ?
hwnd_file_output    dd ?
size_file_input     dd ?
size_file_output    dd 0x2600              ; unpacked binary size (see appendix A)
hmem_file_input     dd ?
hmem_file_output    dd ?
NumberOfBytesToRW  dd ?

section '.code' code readable executable

start:

    invoke CreateFile,file_input,GENERIC_READ,0,NULL,\
        OPEN_EXISTING,FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,NULL
    mov     [hwnd_file_input],eax
    invoke GetFileSize,[hwnd_file_input],NULL
    mov     [size_file_input],eax
    invoke GlobalAlloc,GPTR,[size_file_input]
    mov     [hmem_file_input],eax
    invoke ReadFile,[hwnd_file_input],[hmem_file_input],\
        [size_file_input],NumberOfBytesToRW,NULL
    invoke CloseHandle,[hwnd_file_input]

    invoke GlobalAlloc,GPTR,[size_file_output]
    mov     [hmem_file_output],eax

; Begin of uncompress routine
    pushad
    mov     esi,[hmem_file_input]
    mov     edi,[hmem_file_output]
    cld
    mov     dl,0x80
    xor     ebx,ebx
label_0083013B:
    movs   byte[edi],byte[esi]
    mov     bl,0x02
label_0083013E:
    call   func_008301B0
    jnb    label_0083013B
    xor     ecx,ecx
```

```
call func_008301B0
jnb label_0083016A
xor eax,eax
call func_008301B0
jnb label_0083017A
mov bl,0x02
inc ecx
mov al,0x10
label_0083015C:
call func_008301B0
adc al,al
jnb label_0083015C
jnz label_008301A6
stos byte[edi]
jmp label_0083013E
label_0083016A:
call func_008301BC
sub ecx,ebx
jnz lable_00830183
call func_008301BA
jmp label_008301A2
label_0083017A:
lods byte[esi]
shr eax,0x01
je label_008301CC
adc ecx,ecx
jmp label_0083019F
lable_00830183:
xchg eax,ecx
dec eax
shl eax,0x08
lods byte[esi]
call func_008301BA
cmp eax,0x7D00
jnb label_0083019F
cmp ah,0x05
jnb label_008301A0
cmp eax,0x7F
ja label_008301A1
label_0083019F:
inc ECX
label_008301A0:
inc ECX
label_008301A1:
xchg eax,ebp
label_008301A2:
mov eax,ebp
mov bl,0x01
label_008301A6:
push esi
mov esi,edi
sub esi,eax
```

```
rep movs byte[edi],byte[esi]
pop esi
jmp label_0083013E
label_008301CC:
popad
; end

invoke CreateFile,file_output,GENERIC_WRITE,FILE_SHARE_WRITE,NULL,\
CREATE_ALWAYS,FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,NULL
mov [hwnd_file_output],eax
invoke WriteFile,[hwnd_file_output],[hmem_file_output],\
[size_file_output],nNumberOfBytesToRW,NULL
invoke CloseHandle,[hwnd_file_output]

invoke GlobalFree,[hmem_file_output]
invoke GlobalFree,[hmem_file_input]
invoke ExitProcess,0

func_008301B0:
add dl,dl
jnz label_008301B9
mov dl,byte[esi]
inc esi
adc dl,dl
label_008301B9:
retn

func_008301BA:
xor ecx,ecx
func_008301BC:
inc ecx
label_008301BD:
call func_008301B0
adc ecx,ecx
call func_008301B0
jb label_008301BD
retn

data import

library kernel32,'KERNEL32.DLL',\
user32,'USER32.DLL'

include 'api\kernel32.inc'
include 'api\user32.inc'

end data
```